










“Admissibilidade da prova no processo penal: entre a busca pela 
verdade, os direitos humanos e a eficiência do procedimento”
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AbstrAct: This text presents two models of elimination of undesired 
evidence that operate in common law and continental law states. It 
analyses the mechanisms of blocking information from becoming 
evidence in a criminal trial which can be defined as the procedural 
instruments (solutions) adopted in a given model of criminal trial 
that allow for assessment and eventual elimination of inadmissible 
evidence as deemed to be undesired in the process of fact-finding. 
On the basis of a „model approach” it will be shown how such mech-
anisms of elimination (or blocking) of undesired evidence function in 
the United States and England, Germany, France, Poland and Italy. 
Also the stage of elimination will be analysed, as well as the type of 
procedure of applying a blockade. It will be explained in what ways 
the atomistic and holistic assessment of evidence work and what 
consequences they have. The last part of the text will show how the 
rationale for elimination of evidence in the form of illegality, unreli-
ability or relevance, may result in various consequences depending 
on the seriousness of violation of law. These elements of analysis will 
allow to examine whether the continental and common law models 
of elimination of undesired evidence are coherent and effective and 
whether they allow for achieving the assumed goal of eliminating of 
undesired evidence. In the conclusions it will be shown that the final 
1 Dr hab., professor at the Institute of Law Studies of the Polish Academy of Sci-
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arbiter of admissibility of evidence in both procedural models is a 
judge and how this solution allows for weighting legally protected 
interests in every case. The argumentation presented in the article 
will also lead to an observation that in the continental model of 
elimination of undesired evidence it cannot be said that there is a 
full-fledged “mechanism” of blocking information from becoming 
evidence in a criminal trial.
Keywords: exclusionary rules; comparative criminal procedure; rules 
of evidence; admissibility of evidence.
resumo: Este artigo pretende apresentar dois modelos de exclusão de provas 
indesejáveis que operam em ordenamentos continentais e de common law. 
São analisados os mecanismos de bloqueio de informações antes de se 
tornaram provas no processo penal, os quais podem ser definidos como 
instrumentos (soluções) adotadas em um determinado modelo de processo 
penal que permite a verificação e eventual exclusão de provas inadmissíveis 
pois definidas como indesejáveis à verificação dos fatos. Com base em uma 
“perspectiva de modelo”, será descrito o funcionamento desses mecanismos 
de exclusão (ou bloqueio) de provas indesejáveis nos Estados Unidos e 
na Inglaterra, na Alemanha, na França, na Polônia e na Itália. Também 
serão analisados o estágio da eliminação e o tipo de procedimento para 
aplicar o bloqueio. Analisar-se-á o modo em que a análise atomística e 
holística da prova atua e as suas consequências. A última parte do texto 
irá demonstrar como a existência de distintos motivos para a exclusão da 
prova na forma de ilegalidade, não fiabilidade e irrelevância, a depender da 
gravidade da violação da lei, podem resultar em diferentes consequências. 
Isso permitirá verificar se os modelos continentais ou de common law são 
coerentes e efetivos e se eles atendem ao objetivo almejado de eliminar 
provas indesejáveis. Nas conclusões, será demonstrado que o árbitro 
final sobre admissibilidade da prova em ambos os modelos é o julgador 
e como isso autoriza a ponderação dos interesses legalmente protegidos 
em cada caso. Assim, também se observará que no modelo continental de 
exclusão de provas indesejáveis não se pode afirmar que há um mecanismo 
integralmente desenvolvido para bloquear informações de se tornarem 
provas no processo penal.
PAlAvrAs-chAve: regras de exclusão; processo penal comparado; teoria da 
prova; admissibilidade da prova.
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1. introduction 
In every system of criminal procedure there is evidence that 
is not desired in the process of fact-finding. In most legal orders, an 
undisputed obligation is that every court take into consideration certain 
legally protected values, even at the cost of not finding the truth or letting 
the perpetrator go free. Because of these protected values – becoming 
ever more endangered as states become technically capable of deeper 
intrusions into the sphere of individual privacy – in certain cases fact-
finding cannot be considered as an absolute value and must be subjected 
to certain limitations2. In every state, a mechanism of elimination of 
evidence must be also considered as a necessary systemic reaction to 
a violation of legal provisions by the state authorities in the process of 
evidence gathering. It is assumed that a system that remains indifferent to 
such violations could lead to total arbitrariness of state authorities in this 
2 The need to take into account these other interests and guarantees of the 
rights of an individual makes the law of evidence a branch of a hybrid law - at 
the same time it contains the rules of the methodology of the criminal trial 
and is constitutes an expression of the moral principles and logic applicable in 
a given society: it has not only a normative but also an ethical dimension. See 
e.g.: NIJBOER, Johannes, F. Methods of Investigations and Exclusion of Evi-
dence – a Comparative and Interdisciplinary Perspective. In: Beweisverbote 
in Ländern der EU und vergleichbaren Rechtsordnungen. HÖPFEL, Frank; 
HUBER, Barbara (eds.). Freiburg in Breisgau: Max-Planck-Institut, 1999, p. 
49; ROBERTS, Paul; ZUCKERMAN, Adrian. Criminal Evidence. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2012, p. 17; DAMAŠKA, Mirjam. Free Proof and Its 
Detractors. The American Journal of Comparative Law, n. 3(43), 1995, p. 348; 
HO, Hock Lai. Exclusion of Wrongfully Obtained Evidence: A Comparative 
Analysis. In: Oxford Handbook of Criminal Process. BROWN, Darryl et al. 
(eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 833; WEIGEND, Thomas. 
The Potential to Secure a Fair Trial Through Evidence Exclusion: A German 
Perspective. In: Do Exclusionary Rules Ensure a Fair Trial?: A Comparative 
Perspective on Evidentiary Rules, GLESS, Sabine, RICHTER, Thomas (eds.). 
Basel: Springer, 2019, p. 62. On the role and importance of these values see: 
TURNER, Jenia I., WEIGEND, Thomas, The Purposes and Functions of Ex-
clusionary Rules: A Comparative Overview. In: Do Exclusionary Rules En-
sure a Fair Trial?: A Comparative Perspective on Evidentiary Rules, GLESS, 
Sabine, RICHTER, Thomas (eds.). Basel: Springer, 2019, p. 255-263, who also 
come to a conclusion that as to the rationales of the exclusion of evidence no 
clear divide exists between adversarial and inquisitorial systems, see p. 279.
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regard3. In consequence, a “blockade of information” must be introduced 
(in the German literature: Informationsblockade”4) – or a certain type of 
“evidentiary barrier”5, a “hurdle to admissibility”6 or a “filter”. From a 
dogmatic point of view, such a blockade (barrier) can be perceived as 
a mechanism that operates in order to prevent “information” becoming 
“evidence”. There are various types of such mechanisms across various 
states. They either operate in order to withhold information from the eyes 
of the fact-finder, or to not allow such information to become a basis for 
fact-finding. Consequently, mechanisms of blocking information from 
becoming evidence in a criminal trial can be defined as the procedural 
instruments (solutions) adopted in a given model of criminal trial that 
allow for assessment and eventual elimination of inadmissible evidence 
as deemed to be undesired in the process of fact-finding. This text will 
present the two models of mechanisms of elimination of undesired 
evidence that operate in common law states and continental law states 
and show that the exclusion of undesired information is administered 
differently in these two models of criminal trial.
3 See the literature in Poland: JASIŃSKI, Wojciech. Nielegalnie uzyskane 
dowody w procesie karnym. W poszukiwaniu optymalnego rozwiązania. 
Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer, 2019, p. 41 and in Germany: ROGALL, Klaus. 
Grundsatzfragen der Beweisverbote. In: Beweisverbote in Ländern der EU 
und vergleichbaren Rechtsordnungen. HÖPFEL, Frank, HUBER, Barbara 
(eds.). Freiburg in Breisgau: Max-Planck-Institut, 1999, p. 119, although the 
opinions on this topic in the common law states differ: see. e.g. PIZZI Wil-
liam. Trials Without Truth: Why Our System of Criminal Trials Has Become 
an Expensive Failure and What We Need to Do to Rebuild. New York: NYU 
Press, 1998, p. 38 who writes “If the exclusionary rule is to protect citizens 
against police abuse it is a failure”.
4 This terminology is used frequenlty in the German literature, among oth-
ers by: ROGALL, Klaus. Grundsatzfragen der Beweisverbote, p. 125-126; 
KLEINKNECHT, Theodor. Die Beweisverbote im Strafprozess. Neue Juris-
tische Wochenschrift, n. 19, 1966, p. 1539; KERN, Eduard; ROXIN, Claus. 
Strafverfahrensrecht: ein Studienbuch. München: Beck, 1987, p. 141; and in 
the French literature: BENEDICT, Jerome. Le sort des preuves illégales dans 
le procés pénal. Lausanne: Editions Pro Schola, 1994, p. 49.
5 See the notion used by DAMAŠKA, Mirjam. Evidentiary barriers to convic-
tion and two models of criminal procedure: a comparative study. University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review, n. 121, 1973, p. 508.
6 ROBERTS, Paul, ZUCKERMAN, Adrian, Criminal Evidence… op.cit., p. 97.
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Across different states there are different barriers and different 
mechanisms of elimination of evidence – regarding rules of admissibility of 
evidence, the scope of evidence that should be eliminated, the functioning 
of such mechanisms, and the consequences of their application. The model 
of the mechanism of elimination mirrors the different methods of solving 
conflicts between the values that should be fulfilled by a criminal trial. 
Every model of admissibility of evidence must function in a different 
legal environment and in a different legal culture. In consequence, it has 
broader implications, “which somehow transcend the narrow bounds of 
the law of evidence and affect the working of the whole machinery of 
criminal justice, creating what can be perceived as ‘the two evidentiary 
styles’”7. Mechanisms adopted for elimination of evidence become one of 
the determinants of the given model of criminal trial: be it Anglo-Saxon 
or continental. In both legal traditions a certain “information blockade” 
exists – although in a different form – that allows for eliminating certain 
types of evidence from a fact-finder’s (either a professional court or 
a jury) assessment – either before the trial, during the trial or in the 
process of fact-finding. 
In this article a “model approach” will be presented: an attempt 
will be made to find and analyse the “model schemes” of mechanisms 
of elimination (or blocking) of undesired evidence in common law and 
continental law states. Comparative criminal law has adopted a method of 
conducting comparative research based on the created division into legal 
systems (models) belonging to the Anglo-Saxon common law tradition 
(in other words: the legal family8) that is a model of a strictly adversarial 
criminal procedure, and systems belonging to the tradition of continental 
law (civil law), known also as a mixed or non-adversarial model (by 
representatives of the first tradition also called the inquisitorial model9). 
7 DAMAŠKA, Mirjam. Evidentiary barriers… op.cit., p. 508. PRADEL, Jean. La 
preuve en procédure pénale comparée. Rapport general, Revue International 
de Droit Penal 1992, p. 13.
8 In the normative sense: see GLENN, Patrick, H. Legal Traditions of the 
World. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014, p. 366-367.
9 See: DAMAŠKA, Mirjam. On Structures of Authority and Comparative Crim-
inal Procedure. Yale Law Journal, n. 84, 1974-1975, p. 481 FULLER, Lon, L. 
The Adversary System. In: Talks On American Law. BERMAN, Harold (ed.). 
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The first group includes the models of English and United States trials, 
whereas Polish, French and German criminal procedures belong to the 
second group. The example of Italy cannot be ignored either, as it is 
presently the best example of a continental model of criminal procedure 
of increased adversariality. It introduced certain features of the common 
law model’s approach to evidence (and thus became a kind of a “hybrid 
model”). This model approach has been used by comparativists on an 
international scale, in order to find, define, precise and analyze (also to 
label) contrasts between the above-mentioned models of administration 
of justice10. The concept of a “model” may be understood primarily as 
a “specimen” structure or procedure. Speaking of “legal traditions”, 
authors often refer to “ideal models”, or “theoretical models” of criminal 
trial11 - as, for the purposes of comparative research, it is important to 
distinguish between a “normative model” of the criminal process in a 
given country, and an “ideal model”12 - in other words a “theoretical 
model”. In the theory of criminal trial, a model is understood as a “set 
of basic components of a system that allows differentiating it from other 
systems”, a “common denominator”13. These components (simplifying) 
are constituted by specific procedural institutions, solutions used in a 
New York: Vintage Books, 1971, p. 43–44; THIBAUT, John, WALKER, Lau-
ren, LIND, E. Allan. Adversary presentation and bias in legal decisionmaking. 
Harvard Law Review. n. 86, 1972–1973, p. 390. In German literature: TRÜG, 
Gerson. Lösungskonvergenzen trotz Systemdivergenzen im deutschen und 
US-amerikanischen Strafverfahren. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003, p. 26-27.
10 See: DAMAŠKA, Mirjam. The Faces of Justice and State Authority. New Hav-
en–London: Yale University Press, 1986, p. 3. Also: LANGER, Maximo. From 
Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining 
and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure’, Harvard Internation-
al Law Journal. n. 1(45), 2004, p. 7–8.
11 Discussed in: WEBER, Max. On Law in Economy and Society. Harvard: Har-
vard University Press, 1954, and later by: LANGER, Maximo. From Legal…, 
op.cit., p. 7-8.
12 As in: ROBERTS, Paul. Faces of Justice Adrift? Damaška’s Comparative Meth-
od and the Future of Common Law Evidence. In: Crime, Procedure and Ev-
idence in A Comparative and International Context – Essays in Honour of 
Professor Mirjan Damaška. JACKSON, John, LANGER, Maximo (eds.). Ox-
ford: Hart Publishing, 2008.
13 LANGER, Maximo. From Legal…, op.cit., p. 7-8.
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criminal procedure, principles of criminal trial or functions performed 
by one of the actors in trial. 
The model approach will allow for a generalised overview and – as 
with all model constructs – for finding common ground for discussions 
about comparative criminal procedure. Therefore, the research cannot 
go deeply into specific regulations functioning in the six analysed states. 
It must restrict itself to finding the general mechanisms governing the 
process of elimination of unwanted evidence. The first example of such 
an attempt to generalise the rules of the mechanism of elimination is 
the very title of this text, which speaks of “undesired evidence”; this 
concept is meant to signify all the potential evidence that, for many 
reasons, should not become evidence in a procedural meaning: both 
because of illegalities in the procedure of gathering and because of lack 
of credibility or lack of relevance of the evidence. When formulated 
in a more general way, as “undesired evidence” it provides a common 
platform to discuss the common features of grounds for exclusion of 
evidence in various legal orders. 
Based on these assumptions in the text below, four aspects of 
different procedures aiming at elimination of such unwanted material will 
be analysed. These aspects function as components of every given model 
of elimination of evidence. They were selected on the basis of the fact 
that – despite many differences in the detailed form of the procedures in 
various states – these elements can be found to function in the same aim 
in every one of them. It is the aim – from the functional perspective – 
which binds sometimes different procedures together and allows for a 
coherent analysis from a comparative point of view. 
Firstly, different types of mechanisms of elimination will be 
presented: featured not on the basis of a name of an institution, or the 
reason of application, but on the basis of their aim and the function 
they play in a criminal trial. Four mechanisms may be differentiated: 
exclusionary rules, admissibility rules14, nullity of procedural actions, 
and general fairness of trial. These mechanisms may function separately 
or jointly in one model of criminal trial. 
14 And these two mechanisms should not be mixed as it was mentioned by 
DAMAŠKA, Mirjam. Evidentiary barriers… op.cit., p. 515.
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Secondly, the stage of elimination will be analysed: whether 
the mechanisms of elimination function in the moment of acquiring 
and gathering information that may become evidence (blocking the 
information at the input stage), the stage of processing evidence 
(eliminating evidence while or after presentation at trial when the fact-
finder makes contact with them, at the output stage) or the stage of 
fact-finding (eliminating evidence from the process of fact-finding)15. 
At every stage of a criminal trial, certain mistakes, defects of evidence, 
may appear that lead to elimination of evidence.
Thirdly, the procedure of applying a blockade will be presented, 
during which a state authority may take a decision: it may be a pre-
trial hearing, a voir dire, or a motion to supress evidence procedure, a 
preliminary stage of trial before the evidentiary proceedings begins, as 
in Italy - which all allow for an atomistic assessment of evidence. Even 
a decision taken by a court during evidentiary proceedings by French, 
German or Polish judges constitutes a mechanism of atomistic elimination 
of evidence – as it plays the same role as the above mentioned mechanisms. 
This procedure may be also differently initiated: either on a motion of 
a party or ex officio. The procedure of elimination of evidence from the 
process of fact-finding may also happen in a holistic manner after the 
closure of evidentiary proceedings.
Fourthly, the consequences of application of a mechanism of 
elimination of evidence may differ: usually in most legal orders the reason 
for elimination may be illegality, unreliability and relevance of evidence. 
The meaning every legal system gives to these grounds of elimination 
is different. Also the consequences differ not only depending on the 
type of deficiency of evidence but also depending on the seriousness of 
violation of law – and here the mechanism of “balancing of legal interests” 
will be described.
15 The same structure of analysis of illegaly obtained evidence is marked in: HO, 
Hock Lai. Exclusion of Wrongfully… op.cit., p. 822 and: AMELUNG, Knut. 
Zasady rządzące zakazami wykorzystania dowodów. In: Współczesne prob-
lemy procesu karnego i wymiaru sprawiedliwości. Księga ku czci Profesora 
Kazimierza Marszała. HOFMAŃSKI, Piotr; ZGRYZEK, Kazimierz (eds.). Ka-
towice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2003, p. 17. 
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The purpose of advancing these models will be to analyze how 
the above-mentioned elements of the researched models of elimination 
of evidence operate. They must be evaluated in the light of the question 
of whether each model is coherent and effective, and whether it allows 
for achieving the stated goal of elimination of undesired evidence. The 
analysis will make it possible to find out whether this mechanism of 
blocking information from becoming evidence in a criminal trial functions 
properly, and to identify any deficiencies in the models researched. The 
research will also go into evaluation of the consequences of elimination of 
evidence that will show why the result of determining the inadmissibility 
of a piece of evidence should be practical elimination of such documents 
from the case file. It is also important to compare the connections of 
the adopted model of elimination of evidence with the principles of 
criminal trial. The most important conclusion is that a criminal trial 
can be considered to be adversarial only if the rules of admissibility of 
evidence operate on equal terms for both parties, and when issues of 
admissibility are adjudicated in a clear and equal procedure. 
2. mechAnIsms of elImInAtIon of undesIred evIdence
In order to eliminate undesired evidence from criminal trial 
four different mechanisms can be used: rules of exclusion (which forbid 
gathering certain evidence or in a certain way); admissibility rules 
(which dictate what types of evidence can be admitted at trial), nullity 
of procedural actions (which treats evidence as if it did not exist, as the 
consequence of violations of the rules in procedural actions taken by 
the state authorities), and finally the evaluation of the general fairness 
of a trial by a judge, performed through free assessment. In most legal 
systems these mechanisms function jointly – although sometimes at 
different stages of trial. However, their meaning and the method of 
their application differ between the common law states and continental 
states. In the Anglo-Saxon model, a clear scheme exists that allows for 
elimination of inadmissible evidence at successive stages of assessment, 
and is based on statutory rules. In the continental model a judge acts 
according to the “free proof” theory and is free to decide on the evidence 
that will be admissible - as there are no strict rules of admissibility. In 
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consequence it can be observed that in the latter model the decision as to 
the admissibility of evidence is “shifted” to the stage of decision of a judge.
the Anglo-sAxon APProAch
In the Anglo-Saxon states, the scheme of admissibility rules 
is based on four foundations: the list of admissible evidence, rules of 
exclusion and rules of admissibility, and the final stage of assessment of 
general fairness of the proceedings. “The law of admissibility” is defined 
as the law that regulates whether a particular piece of evidence should be 
received – or “admitted” – into the trial16. The aim of these rules and the 
function they fulfil is to determine whether to allow the fact-finder to be 
informed about a piece of evidence and to give them the opportunity of 
taking it into account in arriving at their verdict. Deciding on admissibility 
of evidence, the judge “regulates the informational resources available 
to the fact-finder”17. 
In this model of evidentiary law, the assessment of admissibility of 
evidence takes place at several stages (which can be described as “hurdles to 
admissibility”, corresponding to a series of questions that a trial judge must 
ask while assessing evidence18): first in a positive and later in a negative 
aspect and then again in positive. The positive aspect means that evidence 
is only admissible in a certain form according to the rules provided by a 
legal act. This assessment must also relate to the question of whether the 
evidence is relevant – irrelevant evidence is conclusively inadmissible 
and does not have to undergo the next stages of assessment. After this 
assessment, the character of the evidence may result in an observation 
that evidence falls within rules of exclusion (such as client privilege or 
state secrets), which means an assessment in a negative aspect. In the 
case of rules of exclusion, the exclusion should be automatic19. As to other 
16 ROBERTS, Paul, ZUCKERMAN, Adrian. Criminal Evidence …. op.cit., p. 96.
17 ROBERTS, Paul, ZUCKERMAN, Adrian. Criminal Evidence … op.cit., p. 97.
18 ROBERTS, Paul, ZUCKERMAN, Adrian. Criminal Evidence… op.cit., p. 97; 
DAMAŠKA, Mirjam. Evidentiary barriers … op.cit., p. 508.
19 CHOO, Andrew. England and Wales: Fair Trial Analysis and the Presumed 
Admissibility of Physical Evidence. In: Exclusionary Rules in Comparative 
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evidence, not falling into one of the above categories, it is presumptively 
admissible, but may be excluded through the exercise of judicial discretion 
to exclude prosecution evidence in order to ensure a “fair trial”. At this 
stage, an assessment of admissibility may take place also in the form of 
applying “soft” standards. 
The best example of this mechanism of assessment of evidence 
functions in the English legal order, where on the basis of s. 78 PACE 
1984, if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, 
including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the 
admission of the evidence (on which the prosecution proposes to rely) 
would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings, the 
court ought not to admit it. At the final stage the inclusionary exceptions 
should be analysed (again, an assessment in a positive aspect) – those 
that can be used for admitting hearsay (in the English legal order that is s. 
114-118 CJA). Inclusionary rules can rescue evidence from presumptive 
inadmissibility. As a consequence of numerous exceptions, evidence 
rendered presumptively inadmissible by the application of an exclusionary 
rule at the last stage of assessment can turn out to be admissible thanks 
to the “protective wing of an inclusionary rule”20. The final arbiter 
of admissibility is a judge, using free evaluation – however, based on 
jurisprudence21. This discretion is limited by the legal provisions of the 
CJA – s. 126 states that “in criminal proceedings the court may refuse 
to admit a statement as evidence of a matter stated if (a) the statement 
was made otherwise than in oral evidence in the proceedings, and (b) 
the court is satisfied that the case for excluding the statement, taking 
account of the danger that to admit it would result in undue waste of time, 
Law. THAMAN, Stephen (ed.). Dordrecht - Heidelberg - New York – Lon-
don: Springer, 2013, p. 331, who counts that there are, in essence, three au-
tomatic exclusionary rules: evidence obtained by torture; the admission in 
evidence of communications intercepted illegally; a confession made by an 
accused person that was obtained by oppression, or by words or actions con-
ducive to unreliability.
20 ROBERTS, Paul, ZUCKERMAN, Adrian. Criminal Evidence … op.cit., p. 98.
21 See e.g.: R v. Jeffries and Chalkley (1998) 2 Cr App R 79; y R v. Latif (Khalid), 
[1996] WLR 104; Attorney-General Reference (No. 3 of 2000) 1 WLR 2060, 
R v. Loosely, [2001] UKHL 53; R v. Smurthwaite (1994) 98 Cr App R 437; R 
v. List (David), [1966] 1 WLR 9; 
54 | KUCzyńSKA, Hanna.
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, v. 7, n. 1, p. 43-92, jan.-abr. 2021. 
substantially outweighs the case for admitting it, taking account of the 
value of the evidence”. This section can be seen both as a rule limiting 
the inclusionary discretion and as an exclusionary rule. Only after the 
three-tier evaluation does information become evidence. In the United 
States a similar formula applies on the federal level as it results from rules 
403-415 of the Federal Rules of Evidence22.
the contInentAl APProAch
The continental model of admissibility of evidence is much 
simpler: there is no positive list of evidence: the free proof rule reigns23. 
However, the mechanism of elimination of evidence also takes a mixed 
form: both rules of exclusion and admissibility rules. Rules of exclusion are 
prohibitions of all types that limit the power to gather or use evidence24. 
In this case the source of these rules is a legal act – the legal act also 
decides about the ban on gathering/using such evidence. However, this 
is not the case for all of the rules of exclusion – the legal consequences 
of only specific parts of rules of exclusion are decided by the legal act. As 
to the remaining part, the rules of judicial freedom of decision apply – 
characteristic of the second stage of assessment.
The second stage of assessment regards evaluation of the evidence 
in the light of the rules of admissibility. Generally in continental states 
these rules are not clearly described. The consequences of deficiencies 
of evidence are not provided for by a legal act. The final decision is 
left to the free assessment of a judge. The judge can act on the basis 
of a conviction that a certain piece of evidence is “inadmissible”. This 
decision finds its grounds in the continental codes of criminal procedure 
(in Poland it is art. 170 § 1 of the code of criminal procedure - k.p.k., and 
22 As amended December 1, 2020, see: https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre 
(access 7.12.2020).
23 DAMAŠKA, Mirjam. Free Proof … op.cit., p. 347-348.
24 SKORUPKA Jerzy. Eliminowanie z procesu karnego dowodów uzyskanych w 
sposób sprzeczny z prawem. In: Dowody. Vol. VIII(2), System Prawa Karne-
go Procesowego. SKORUPKA, Jerzy (ed.). Warszawa: Wolter Kluwer 2019, 
p. 2767.
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in Germany § 244(1) StPO). These provisions both stipulate that it is 
possible to overrule an evidentiary motion of a party when such evidence 
is “inadmissible” (niedopuszczalny, unzulässig) – and the interpterion of 
this notion is left to a casuistic decision of a judge. Also rules of general 
character that forbid using certain types of information constitute an 
equal source of inadmissibility: rules of criminal procedure (such as the 
fair trial principle), the Constitution or the ECHR. 
In consequence, there is no possibility to formulate certain and 
clear rules of admissibility that would be known in advance. Thus, the 
decision as to the admissibility of evidence is “shifted” to the stage of 
decision of a judge. It is the judge who decides on the basis of assessment 
of the potential value for fact-finding and the harm done to the rights of the 
accused as well as principles of a fair trial25. It may be noticed that in this 
way the courts – above all the Supreme Courts - go beyond the “normal” 
continental role – “interpretative” and “commentatory” – and enter into 
the domain of law-making, providing for a model reaction on undesired 
evidence. The continental judge not only decides about the admission of 
all the evidence (both applied for by the parties and ex officio) but later 
decides about the value of this evidence during the fact-finding stage.
After these two stages of assessment of the evidence, the final 
stage is the holistic evaluation of the totality of evidence presented (or 
revealed) in the case as to credibility, relevance and meaning for the 
case. It is characteristic of the continental model that these three stages 
of evaluation of evidence can take place both during atomistic, a priori 
evaluation, and during the holistic stage of evaluation. At the latter stage, 
this model rejects formal rules of evaluation of evidence: both as to the 
credibility of evidence and to its relevance. On the continent it is believed 
that it is not possible to decide a priori, on the level of a legal act, about 
the relevance and credibility of evidence26. As a professional, the fact-
finder does not have to be protected by numerous rules of admissibility 
25 On this rationale as a ground for exclusion see: HO, Hock Lai. The Fair Trial 
Rationale for ExcludingWrongfully Obtained Evidence. In: Do Exclusionary 
Rules Ensure a Fair Trial?: A Comparative Perspective on Evidentiary Rules, 
GLESS, Sabine; RICHTER, Thomas (eds.). Basel: Springer 2019, p. 288. 
26 DAMAŠKA, Mirjam. Evidence Law Adrift, Yale: Yale University Press, 1997, 
p. 20, DAMAŠKA, Mirjam. Evidentiary barriers … op.cit., p. 515.
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of evidence as they can professionally assess the relevance and credibility 
and the weight of the evidence. From the continental point of view the 
alternative would signify shifting the “decision-making centre” to the 
level of a legal act from the level of the free assessment of a judge27. 
The theory of free proof in this model is bound to the overwhelming 
importance of free evaluation of evidence – the emphasis in the procedure 
of evaluation is placed on the “ordinary process of cognition” of judges, 
who are supposed to arrive at “an intime conviction” about guilt28. In 
the Anglo-Saxon model evidence is declared by the legal provision to 
be unreliable because of the way it was obtained, and is considered to 
be inadmissible at the first positive stage of assessment of admissibility. 
Thus, the stage of credibility assessment differs between the two models: 
in the Anglo-Saxon model it is an a priori assessment, in the continental 
model - a posteriori assessment29. In the continental model, evidence that 
lacks credibility will most often be presented and subjected to a holistic 
analysis, although this is not a rule: it may also be rejected a prori on the 
basis of statutory premises as “inadmissible”.
When analysing the system of elimination of undesired evidence 
in continental states one cannot forget about the mechanism of “nullity” 
of a procedural legal action or “evidentiary nullity”. This mechanism 
27 STEINBORN, Sławomir. Aksjologiczne uwarunkowania ograniczeń w do-
chodzeniu do prawdy materialnej w procesie karnym. In: Pojęcie, miejsce 
i znaczenie prawdy materialnej w polskim procesie karnym: materiały 
Wrocławskiego Seminarium karnoprocesowego. SKORUPKA, Jerzy; KRE-
MENS, Karolina (eds.). Wrocław 2013, p. 98-107.
28 DAMAŠKA, Mirjam. Free Proof and Its Detractors … op.cit., p. 348.
29 WEIGEND, Thomas. Germany. In: Toward a Prosecution for the European 
Union. Vol I. LIGETI, Katalin (ed.), Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013, p. 296-
297; BILLIS, Emmanouil. Die Rolle des Richters im adversatorischen und im 
inquisitorischen Beweisverfahren. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2015, p. 64; 
ROGALL, Klaus. Beweisverbote im System des deutschen und des amerikan-
ischen Strafverfahrens-rechts. In: Zur Theorie und Systematik des Strafproz-
essrechts: Symposium zu Ehren von Hans-Joachim Rudolphi. WOLTER, Jür-
gen (ed.). Berlin: Luchterhand, 1995, p. 113-160; GRÜNWALD, Gerald. Das 
Beweisrecht der Strafprozeßordnung, Baden-Baden: Nomos,, p. 143; GLESS, 
Sabine. Das Verhältnis von Beweiserhebungs-und Beweisverwertungsverbo-
ten und das Prinzip »Iocus regit actum. In: Festschrift für Gerald Grünwald, 
SAMSON, Erich, DENCKER, Friedrich, FRISCH, Peter, FRISTER, Helmut, 
REIß, Wolfram (eds.). Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999, p. 197-198.
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functions in France and Italy. There is a special procedure that allows for 
nullification of actions taken by state authorities, and all the consequences 
of such. As a result of such a decision, evidence must be considered non-
existent – ex tunc (by textual nullities) or may be pronounced null and 
void, where a violation of formalities has had the effect of damaging the 
interests of the party concerned (by substantive nullities)30. A nullity is 
a defect in the act, hypothetically, where a legitimate power to gather 
evidence was exercised in a way that did not conform to the law – and 
thus should be distinguished from “non-usability of evidence”, which 
refers to prohibited evidence31. It is also a mechanism of elimination of 
evidence as well – but not in the result of evaluation of substantive value 
and meaning of evidence but only formal premises of executing a legal 
action by state authorities.
From the point of view of the Anglo-Saxon literature, this model 
of management of evidence is chaotic and unpredictable. However, from 
the continental point of view, this perspective is mistaken. Anglo-Saxon 
lawyers focus on courtroom rules and consider the rules of admissibility 
only from this perspective. Therefore, they often omit the numerous 
evidentiary rules that apply at the stage of investigation. This is the main 
forum for application of detailed evidentiary law in the continental model 
of criminal procedure – as writes J. Ross32. Evidentiary rules tend to be 
activated mostly at the stage of gathering evidence (before acquiring 
evidence), not just at the stage of presentation. The lack of admissibility 
30 PRADEL, Jean. Procedural Nullities and Exclusion,. In: Exclusionary Rules in 
Comparative Law. THAMAN, Stephen (ed.). Dordrecht - Heidelberg - New 
York – London: Springer, 2013, p. 148. In the Anglo-Saxon literature this 
method of reaction is considered to be „older” than „modern” exclusionary 
rules. See: THAMAN, Stephen. Balancing Truth Against Human Rights: A 
Theory of Modern Exclusionary Rules. In: Exclusionary Rules in Compar-
ative Law. THAMAN Stephen (ed.). Dordrecht - Heidelberg - New York – 
London: Springer, 2013, p. 410, who explains how “nullities”, in the abstract, 
differ from modern exclusionary rules.
31 ILLUMINATI, Giulio. Italy: Statutory Nullities and Non-usability., In: Exclu-
sionary Rules in Comparative Law. THAMAN, Stephen (ed.). Dordrecht Hei-
delberg New York London: Springer, 2013, p. 244-245.
32 ROSS, Jacqueline. Do Rules of Evidence Apply (Only) in the Courtroom? De-
ceptive Interrogation in the United States and Germany. Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies, n. 3(28), 2008), p. 444.
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rules applicable at trial does not mean that there are no rules determining 
the desired shape of information in order to become evidence. It only 
means that there are two possible ways of acquiring the desired form of 
evidence: either at the stage of gathering or at the stage of presentation. In 
the first model, only information gathered and preserved in a specific form 
may be presented during trial. Investigative rules function as evidentiary 
rules to the extent that they filter and shape the information that reaches 
the trier of fact. Exactly like Anglo-Saxon rules of evidence, continental 
investigative rules transmute raw data into evidence, determining which 
information reaches the fact-finder, and the manner in which it is framed. 
In consequence, as J. Ross argues: this difference leads to a conclusion 
that the rules (specifically interrogation rules) that operate at such an 
early stage of procedure, are better seen as norms designed to protect 
the accused from the police – whereas the Anglo-Saxon rules have a 
primary goal of keeping certain facts from the fact-finder. “This makes 
evidentiary rules difficult to evade”33. Nonetheless, it has to be stressed 
that this rule only applies to the evidence gathered by the accusation 
in the preparatory proceedings – and does not operate at trial, when 
parties present their evidentiary motions that are to be assessed by the 
judge during trial. 
3. thE stagE of EliMination of undEsirEd EvidEncE
It is important to determine at what stage the decision as to the 
elimination of evidence is taken. One can speak of “blocking information” 
from becoming “evidence” when two stages are considered: gathering of 
evidence and presentation in trial (then information does not become 
evidence). However, once evidence is included in the preparatory 
proceedings file (in the continental model) or presented at trial (in both 
models) it is not the notion of “blocking of information” that should be 
used but “disqualification”. In the last case, the fact-finder has knowledge 
of the evidence, but cannot use it in the fact-finding process. Elimination 
of evidence can thus take both the form of blocking of information and 
33 ROSS, Jacqueline. Do Rules … op.cit., p. 472.
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its disqualification. In the doctrine of comparative criminal procedure it 
has been established that that the Anglo-Saxon courts base their decisions 
mainly on the “atomistic”, prior, evaluation of evidence, whereas the 
continental judges evaluate evidence in a holistic, total, manner, after 
termination of evidentiary proceedings. However, it will be shown below, 
that this conviction is not entirely precise.
the Anglo-sAxon APProAch
In the Anglo-Saxon model, the scheme of elimination of evidence 
is clear: there is no possibility to consider the notion of “evidence” before 
the trial stage, as there is no formal investigation stage. Therefore, this 
model more often and usually results in “blocking of information”. It is 
only after issuing an indictment that the problem of “forging” information 
(“data”, “information about evidence”) into “evidence” appears in the 
procedural meaning34. Such types of blocking of evidence rely on a priori 
evaluation of admissibility of evidence. It has been established in the 
doctrine of comparative criminal procedure that the Anglo-Saxon courts 
are based mainly on the “atomistic” evaluation of evidence35. Atomistic 
assessment signifies evaluation of every piece of evidence separately: 
according to rules of exclusion, admissibility rules, credibility, relevance 
and legality. In consequence, only admissible evidence can be presented at 
trial, and no information can reach the eyes of the fact-finder if it has not 
become evidence in the procedural sense36. In this model, the inadmissible 
evidence remains “frozen” before trial and does not reach the eyes of the 
fact-finder. This type of blockade eliminates the danger of “contamination” 
of the fact-finder’s mind with information that should not be included in 
the evidentiary material. In this model the atomistic evaluation of evidence 
comes into play on two stages of criminal proceedings: before trial during 
34 VAN CAENEGEM, William. New trends in illegal evidence in criminal proce-
dure: general report – common law, Paper presented at XIII World Congress 
of Procedural law, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. https://research.bond.edu.au/en/
publications/new-trends-in-illegal-evidence-in-criminal-procedure-gener-
al-repo (access: 18.11.2020). 
35 DAMAŠKA, Mirjam. Evidentiary barriers … op.cit., p. 519-520.
36 DAMAŠKA, Mirjam. Evidentiary barriers … op.cit., p. 519-520.
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various types of pre-trial hearings and during trial in the form of a ruling 
over an objection of the opposite party. In the latter procedure it may 
relate to an entire piece of evidence (a certain witness) or a part of this 
evidence (a certain question to a witness, e.g. during cross-examination). 
However, it is not possible to claim that in the Anglo-Saxon 
model of criminal procedure, only an atomistic assessment of evidence is 
conducted. The fact-finder after presentation of all evidence must proceed 
with its holistic evaluation. It is not an assessment of the admissibility of 
evidence, but of value and relevance for the case, as well as credibility. 
It must also take into consideration the summary by the presiding 
judge, where s/he informs the jury about the potential problems with 
the credibility of evidence (as in the case of doubtful confessions). 
Nonetheless, the holistic assessment is not part of the mechanism of 
elimination of evidence, but of its evaluation. 
the contInentAl APProAch
At the same time, the continental states are considered to exercise 
only holistic assessment of evidence (a posteriori)37. According to this 
concept the totality of evidence undergoes a total assessment after 
finalization of evidentiary proceedings38. This method of assessment of 
admissibility of evidence has the result that the blockade of information 
works only at the stage of fact-finding. It is more “disqualification” of 
evidence than “blocking”, as it takes place in the process of fact-finding. 
Although when the fact-finder disposes of certain information they 
decide to “forget about” their influence on the findings – it is “the law’s 
demand that evidence be disregarded”39. However, this simplified position 
37 DAMAŠKA, Mirjam. Free Proof … op.cit.., p. 349 and in the Polish literature: 
JASIŃSKI, Wojciech. Nielegalnie … op.cit., p. 74.
38 DAMAŠKA, Mirjam. Free Proof … op.cit., p. 349; TWINNING, William. The-
ories of Evidence: Bentham and Wigmore. (Jurists: Profiles in Legal Theory). 
London: Stanford University Press 1985, p. 183-185.
39 DAMAŠKA, Mirjam. Free Proof … op.cit., p. 350, who argues that on this 
stage of fact-finding “the implementation of exclusionary rules is psycholog-
ically difficult and easily acquire an aura of unreality”.
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cannot be supported, as it does not refer to two relevant aspects of the 
continental evidentiary law. 
Firstly, inadmissibility of evidence can stem not only from the 
way of gathering of this evidence, which can be perceived before trial, 
but also from the way of using it in trial (e.g. if a witness refused to 
testify, thus his/her earlier testimony cannot be considered to constitute 
evidence). In this situation it is sometimes impossible to predict that 
certain evidence may become illegal as a result of their use in trial. 
Evidence that is legal in preparatory proceedings can become illegal at 
trial – as the “defectiveness” may arise at trial. 
This situation is explained in the German literature: a rule of 
exclusion (Beweisverbote) is either a rule excluding gathering evidence 
(Beweiserhebungsverbote) or a rule excluding the use of evidence 
(Beweisverwertungsverbote)40. Both types of rules play the same role: they 
“block” the use of information by the judge (”Informationsblockade”) in 
the process of fact-finding (§ 261 StPO). However, there is no automatic, 
legally established, reaction to either type of “defectiveness”. The StPO 
does not provide for an information, what the consequences of using 
such evidence are41. These two types of rules of admissibility are not 
necessarily bound to each other. A rule excluding the use of evidence 
does not always stem from, nor is it always a derivative of a rule excluding 
gathering evidence. Usually it is so but there are many situations where 
a rule excluding the use of evidence is of an independent character42. 
Additionally, besides these two types of rules of admissibility, there may 
be also rules forbidding the use of evidence on a third stage: the rule 
excluding the possibility to conduct fact-finding on the basis of certain 
evidence – in the case of the continental model it would be often a “soft” 
prohibition, e.g. as in the case of rule forbidding fact-finding on the basis 
of incredible evidence43. 
40 KLEINKNECHT, Theodor. Die Beweisverbote im Strafprozess. Neue Juris-
tische Wochenschrift, n. 19, 1966, p. 1539; KERN, Eduard; ROXIN, Claus. 
Strafverfahrensrecht: ein Studienbuch. München: Beck, 1987, p. 141.
41 BENEDICT Jerome. Le sort des preuves ...op.cit., p. 51.
42 ROGALL, Klaus. Grundsatzfragen der Beweisverbote…. op.cit., p. 126.
43 KWIATKOWSKI, Zbigniew. Model zakazów dowodowych de lege lata w pol-
skim procesie karnym. In: Nowe spojrzenie na model zakazów dowodowych 
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In the French doctrine the notion of “legal evidence” (preuves 
legales) is distinguished from “legality of evidence” (legalité des preuves). 
Whereas the first notion relates to evidence which is not in conformity 
with the rules established in the legal act, the second relates to the way 
of administering of the evidence (l’interdictions d’utilisation)44. In the 
second case, legality should be connected with the way of presentation 
the evidence in a courtroom (l’administration de preuves). In the hybrid 
model of criminal trial (continental with increased adversariality) in Italy 
“non-usability” can be understood as a prohibition on admitting evidence 
(a priori) or a prohibition on taking it into account in the process of fact-
finding (a posteriori). As it is admitted: “Inadmissibility of evidence and 
a prohibition on evaluating it are two sides of the same coin, in the sense 
that if evidence cannot be admitted, neither may it be evaluated and, vice 
versa, if it may not be used for the decision, it should not be admitted”45.
Secondly, the atomistic evaluation of evidence takes place at 
trial when the presiding judge makes a decision on every single piece 
of evidence before its presentation, ruling on its admissibility according 
to the codified premises, though very general ones. In consequence, 
there is a barrier between “evidence” in preparatory proceeding and in 
trial. Even if evidence is included in the case file, the decision of a judge 
is needed in order to include it into the caseload. A court is not bound 
by the assessment conducted by an investigative organ: even if certain 
information was considered to be evidence in preparatory proceedings, 
the court is not exempted from its independent assessment46. It is only 
the decision of the judge that allows for its “metamorphosis”. However, 
although this scheme seems to be clear, it is characteristic that the notion 
w procesie karnym. SKORUPKA, Jerzy (ed.). Warszawa 2014, p. 61.
44 BENEDICT, Jerome. Le sort des preuves ... op.cit., p. 20; GIUDICEL-
LI-DELAGE, Geneviève. Les transformations de l’administration de la preuve 
pénale. Perspectives comparées  : Allemagne, Belgique, Canada, Espagne, 
Etats-Unis, France, Italie, Portugal, Royaume-Uni. Archives de politique crimi-
nelle, n. 26(1), 2004, p. 72.
45 ILLUMINATI, Guilio. Italy: Statutory Nullities, p. 240.
46 WILIŃSKI, Paweł. Konstytucyjny standard legalności dowodu w procesie 
karnym In: Proces karny w dobie przemian. Zagadnienia ogólne. STEIN-
BORN, Sławomir., WOŹNIEWSKI, Krzysztof (eds.). Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo 
UG, 2018, p. 310.
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of “evidence” is often used in an “atechnical” manner in the continental 
literature: signifying not only evidence allowed by the judge in trial but 
also a source of information, the result of presenting evidence – and is 
also applicable during the investigative phase47. 
Atomistic assessment of evidence is conducted on the basis 
of premises that allow the court to reject the evidentiary motion (art. 
170 § 1 k.p.k. or § 244 ust. 3 StPO). In the continental states for the 
evidentiary law of key importance is the notion of an “evidentiary motion” 
(Beweisantrag), by which is meant a demand on behalf of a party to 
the proceedings, directed to the court to allow for presentation of the 
evidence (see: art. 167 k.p.k., § 219(1) StPO, art. 444 French c.p.p.). In 
this model of evidentiary proceedings it is the court that admits evidence. 
The role of a party in the perspective of presentation of evidence is a role 
of a “petitioner”, an “informant” who draws the attention of the court 
to the possible evidence that could be relevant in the case. This power 
is accompanied by a “twin power” to admit evidence ex officio, giving 
to the judge the power of evidentiary initiative. It is the decision of the 
court that transforms “information” into “evidence” for the purpose of 
a trial. This power makes it a dominant organ that controls the totality 
of evidentiary proceedings. The last element of this model is lack of 
procedure in which it would be possible to control the court’s power as 
there is no appeal procedure for this decision. A decision not to admit 
evidence can be usually appealed only during an appeal procedure. Also a 
French judge must assess evidentiary motions before trial or during trial 
(art. 444 c.p.p., art. 6 ECHR48), based on either on prohibitions on the 
use of evidence scattered throughout the code of criminal procedure (e.g. 
art. 432 c.p.p. prohibiting the use as evidence correspondence between 
a lawyer and his/her client, or art. 706-62 c.p.p., prohibiting ruling 
basing solely on the anonymous witness’ testimonies), or on the basis 
of rules interpreted from the general procedural principles, which are 
considered: legalism, loyalty, proportionality and dignity49. In this model 
of elimination of evidence, the decision is taken by the same authority 
47 ILLUMINATI, Giulio. Italy: Statutory Nullities … op.cit., p. 239.
48 PRADEL, Jean. Procédure pénale, Paris: Cujas, 2014, p. 774.
49 PRADEL, Jean. Procédure pénale … op.cit., p. 354-357.
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which decides on the facts of the case (even in the case of a jury trial in 
Italy and France, as the jury is then unified with the professional court) 
and the fact-finder is (at least partly) a professional. 
In consequence, the continental model uses a double mechanism 
of elimination of evidence: before admitting evidence to be presented in 
the trial, the presiding judge a priori assesses the evidence is “admissible” 
and during the fact-finding process, when the judge decides about the facts 
of the case. There are no “positive” rules that would describe what premises 
should be fulfilled in order to admit a certain piece of evidence. The judge 
can apply all the elements of assessment: legality, relevance to the case, 
actual feasibility of conducting – and also the rules of a fair trial. Whereas 
the Anglo-Saxon model introduces positive premises (“evidence should be 
relevant and credible”), the continental law disposes of “negative” premises 
(“evidentiary motion will be rejected if it is irrelevant or inadmissible”). 
Both constructs assume that the potential sources of information are 
assessed a priori, in an atomistic model. 
On the other hand, if some evidence has already been introduced 
at the continental trial, it is re-assessed in a holistic manner after the trial 
(by the same person or persons), i.e. in the perspective of its importance 
in the light of all the evidence presented in the case. This is also the stage 
where the credibility of the evidence is most often assessed and, again, its 
significance for the case, if the initial control did not lead the court to the 
conclusion that the evidence should be inadmissible. After the evidence 
has been introduced in trial, judges have to decide whether they can base 
their decision on the evidence or they will try to “forget” about it and not 
base a decision on it. If the evidence has already been used or conducted, 
then at the a posteriori evaluation stage there can be no question of a 
blockade on use. At most it can be a disqualification of such evidence in 
the process of fact-finding. In the latter situation, the judge has to “erase” 
his/her knowledge gained from excluded evidence – obtained by reading in 
case files exhibits or by observing the presentation of conducted evidence 
in trial. This leads to a dilemma as to whether s/he will be able to do it 
effectively. If not, the elimination of the evidence is only formal, not real50. 
50 GLESS, Sabine. Germany: Balancing Truth Against Protected Constitutional 
Interests. In: Exclusionary Rules in Comparative Law. THAMAN, Stephen 
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From the normative point of view this model is clear. However, the 
practical application of these solutions raises many questions – especially 
in regards to the evidence presented by the prosecutor in the case file. 
The decision about including certain pieces of evidence into evidentiary 
material is taken after a judge gets acquainted with them reading the case 
file. In consequence, a continental judge enters a courtroom equipped 
in the knowledge of all the evidence gathered so far in the case at the 
stage of investigation (in the continental states known as preparatory 
proceedings)51. Thus, the method of dealing with evidence is necessarily 
connected with the existence of a dossier of a criminal case. The judge 
decides about admissibility of evidence while often having prior knowledge 
of its content. Moreover, if the evidence is included in the case file, the 
judge can order that that documents in case file are considered to be 
“disclosed” at trial. This decision, expressed in the minutes of the trial 
includes the “disclosed” evidence in the frames of evidentiary material. 
Such a legal construct is absent in Anglo-Saxon trials. 
4. Procedure of Assessment of AdmIssIbIlIty of evIdence 
In every legal order a mechanism of elimination of evidence 
should take the form of a certain procedure that will construct a procedural 
forum of assessment of admissibility. In the Anglo-Saxon states the 
admissibility of evidence is decided during a special type of an adversarial 
procedure, by a professional judge in the absence of the jury. This model 
allows for both a thorough analysis of admissibility of evidence and for 
keeping such doubtful evidence from the eyes of the adjudicator. Contrary 
to this, in the continental states there is no special procedure and forum 
for such an assessment, as the admissibility of evidence is evaluated by 
a professional judge usually at trial or at best during a in camera hearing.
(ed.). Dordrecht - Heidelberg - New York – London: Springer 2013, p. 118, 
who observes that „This dilemma brings about a strong risk of diluting the 
impact of exclusionary rules”.
51 This is usually not true in the Italian criminal proceedings as it does not be-
long to a strictly continental model of criminal procedure but to its more 
adversarial version, that could be called “the continental model of increased 
adversariality”.
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the Anglo-sAxon APProAch
The mechanism of blocking information in the Anglo-Saxon 
model of evidentiary law functions at many stages. The first stage takes 
place before trial: after disclosure (discovery) of evidence of the opposite 
party the parties issue motions to declare certain pieces of evidence as 
inadmissible (in the United States it is a “motion to supress”). In such a 
motion the party must specify with particularity the grounds upon which 
the motion is based (e.g. by alleging that the evidence in question was 
obtained from the defendant incident to an arrest that was not made 
upon probable cause or lack of “voluntariness” of a confession)52. The 
motions are usually recognised during a pre-trial hearing: depending on a 
legal system such hearings have different names and are either dedicated 
solely to admissibility issues or also other issues can be decided. E.g. in the 
United States there is a special type of procedure known as a suppression 
hearing. In England in the magistrates’ courts there are pre-trial hearings 
and in the Crown Courts - management hearings. Such a hearing is 
adversarial – the parties have the opportunity to present arguments (and 
evidence) in favour of the motion and to confront the arguments of the 
opposite party. In the process of assessment the judge may conduct an 
inquiry as to the nature and method of acquiring the evidence. Thus, this 
procedure is often treated as a “trial within a trial”.
In this model the admissibility of evidence is decided by a 
professional judge in the absence of the jury (which has not normally 
been appointed yet). However, in the case of a bench trial (and before 
the magistrates’ courts) it is the professional judge who decides on the 
admissibility of the evidence – the court has discretion to exclude evidence 
if it would bear unfairly on the proceedings53. This is not a rule that the 
admissibility questions are decided by another judge as recognises the 
case. Usually magistrates are informed about the nature of the evidence 
before ruling as to whether it is admissible or not. “If they decide that it 
52 LAFAVE, Wayne, ISRAEL, Jerold, KING, Nancy, KERR, Orin. Criminal Proce-
dure. St. Paul: West Academic Publishing, 2009, p. 557.
53 WAINE, Lydia, MAY, Radmila, POWLES, Steven. May on criminal evidence. 
Sweet & Maxwel 2015, p. 494.
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is inadmissible they must ignore it”54. Thus, in this model of evidentiary 
proceedings the fact-finder is sometimes faced with the need to disregard 
evidence that s/he has knowledge of. However, there are many voices 
pointing to a need to protect the fact-finder from undesired evidence 
also in this procedure55.
It is also possible to question the admissibility of evidence 
during a trial. If the party demonstrates that it was not possible to 
question the admissibility of the evidence earlier, it is possible to 
submit a motion to supress evidence also during trial. Thus, there 
is a certain type of “correctional procedure”, where the party has 
a second chance for convincing the judge about inadmissibility of 
evidence, using new evidence and more convincing arguments. The 
mechanism of elimination is initiated by a party who submits objection 
as to the admissibility of evidence and supports it by a legal ground for 
inadmissibility. In England this procedure is known before the Crown 
Courts as voir dire56 (whereas in the United States the same name is 
used to describe the procedure in which the composition of a jury 
may be questioned57). Because of numerous rules of admissibility of 
evidence and their complicated structure, in many cases the legal status 
of information must be explained and decided in actual time of trial. 
Also in this procedure a presiding judge may “filter” the evidence that 
will be presented to the fact-finder – if it is a jury trial. Consequently, 
in this model of trial, a certain part of a trial is devoted to deliberation 
between counsellors and determining the issues of admissibility. In this 
procedure every party has an opportunity to present its argumentation 
as to its position. Only after adversary discussion the court takes a 
decision: either sustains the objection or overrules it. In practice, 
when an inadmissibility question is raised, the presiding judge will 
54 WAINE, Lydia, MAY, Radmila, POWLES, Steven. May on criminal … op.cit., 
p. 301.
55 WAINE, Lydia, MAY, Radmila, POWLES, Steven. May on criminal … op.cit., 
p. 494.
56 See: s. 76 and 78 PACE 1984 and more: WAINE, Lydia, MAY, Radmila, 
POWLES, Steven. May on criminal … op.cit., p. 477-479.
57 LAFAVE, Wayne, ISRAEL, Jerold, KING, Nancy, KERR, Orin. Criminal Proce-
dure … op.cit., p. 1084.
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hear the parties in a way that is not audible to jurors: either at sidebar 
or in chambers58. The judge will ask the jurors to leave the courtroom 
only when the deliberations would take more time. If it happens (as 
it sometimes does) that the jury is present during deliberation over 
admissibility of evidence – it will be informed by the presiding judge 
about the obligation to “disregard” such evidence that was considered to 
be inadmissible (however, in the United States this should not be done 
as to search and seizure claims59). The issues of raising objections in 
trial are crucial to the way of conducting the presentation of evidence 
in trial: formulating objections in the right moment of trial is an art of 
searching for a maximum effect on jurors. Obviously it plays a much 
smaller role in bench trials. 
One of the elements of the mechanism of blocking information is 
the method of its initiation. For the Anglo-Saxon model a characteristic 
feature is initiation of the control mechanism by a party – and it is 
a mechanism of controlling the behaviour of the other party: they 
are “strategic protests of one lawyer against the tactics of another. 
And since these objections of counsel do not involve criticism of the 
ultimate fact finder – the judge, or the jury (…) they can be made by 
attorneys with relative ease”. The judge has no obligation to control 
the admissibility of evidence and in practice rarely exercises this 
control. If any of the parties levers the admissibility of evidence, the 
evidence is effectively introduced in the evidentiary material. Thus, 
only the reaction of the opposite party and signalisation of one of the 
grounds of inadmissibility may result in exclusion of the evidence. On 
the other hand, the continental lawyer submitting objection as to the 
admissibility of evidence makes a move against the judge and risks 
“antagonising those who decide on facts”60. 
58 MIRFIELD, Peter. Silence, Confessions and Improperly Obtained Evidence. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 257; LAFAVE, Wayne, ISRAEL, Je-
rold, KING, Nancy, KERR, Orin. Criminal Procedure … op.cit., p. 1166.
59 LAFAVE, Wayne, ISRAEL, Jerold, KING, Nancy, KERR, Orin. Criminal Proce-
dure … op.cit., p. 569-570.
60 DAMAŠKA, Mirjam. Evidence Law …op.cit., p. 86.
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the contInentAl APProAch
The Continental model does not use any special type of procedure 
during which evaluation of admissibility of evidence could be undertaken. 
The “procedure” limits itself to a sole “decision” taken by the court. The 
admissibility of evidence can be decided on two stages: either during 
pre-trial procedures (in camera hearings, which in most of the states are 
not adversarial) or in trial. In both cases this is a single decision of a judge 
that exhausts the whole “procedure”. There is usually no discussion on 
this topic nor is there an interlocutory appeal allowed. Although there 
is a “simplified version” of the “adversary” formula: when a party makes 
a motion, the other party is asked if it supports the motion or objects 
to it. The decision to reject an evidentiary motion takes the form of a 
“court’s decision”, whereas allowing for admittance of evidence can 
be conclusive61. Characteristic to this model, the prosecution usually 
exhausts its evidentiary motions in the frames of the attachment to an 
indictment where it formulates the evidence that is wishes to present 
in trial. Also in this case this attachment is considered to constitute an 
evidentiary motion and the particular evidentiary motions could be 
rejected. However, in some states this is not the case. As what evidence 
will be introduced does not depend on the parties, it often happens that 
evidentiary motions formulated in the indictment are fully realised, 
compared to not a single one of the motions of the defence. Poland is a 
sad example of this tendency. 
This model of proceeding on evidentiary motions includes one 
more trait: once evidence is included in the file of preparatory proceeding 
there is no procedure for demanding the exclusion of such evidence. 
There is a tendency to consider as evidence the results of the prosecutor’s 
investigations62. In consequence, the existence of a case file leads to 
61 ŚWIECKI, Dariusz. Przeprowadzanie dowodów na rozprawie głównej. Wy-
brane zagadnienia. In: Proces karny w dobie przemian. Przebieg postępowa-
nia, STEINBORN, Sławomir; WOŹNIEWSKI, Krzysztof (eds.). Gdańsk: Wy-
dawnictwo UG, 2018, p.283.
62 MARAFIOTI, Luca. Italian Criminal Procedure: A System Caught Between 
Two Traditions. In: Crime, Procedure and Evidence in a Comparative and 
International Context: Essays in Honour of Prof. Mirjan Damaška. JACKSON, 
John; LANGER, Maximo (eds.). Hart Publishing, 2008, p. 93.
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serious malfunction of the system of eliminating evidence: even the 
results of illegal actions of state authorities must remain “stuck” in the 
file. Some continental states have noticed the dangers of such a solution 
and introduced “double-dossier” as Italy, or prohibition of inclusion of 
police-interrogations in the evidentiary material, as Germany. However, 
in Poland and France what comes into the file, stays in the file, and the 
presiding judge before trial has the opportunity to get the knowledge of 
all evidence taken in the preparatory proceeding – even if s/he decides 
later that there constituted “evidence” in the phase of preparatory 
proceedings only but not in trial phase. 
This lack of special procedure in continental states is considered 
to constitute a serious flaw in the mechanism of elimination of 
evidence. Adopting such a special procedure became one of the main 
characteristic features of the continental model of trial of increased 
adversariality. In Italy, not only is there a separate file for the trial 
stage, but also a separate procedure for deciding about admissibility 
of evidence. According to art. 431 of the Italian c.p.p. a special “pre-
trial (preliminary) judge” (giudice dell’udienza preliminare) during 
a pre-trial hearing decides on the transfer of evidence from the 
prosecutor’s file (the investigative dossier) into the trial file (“fascicolo 
per il dibattimento”). This system, called the “double dossier-system” 
(“doppio fascicolo”), was created in order to avoid bias to the trial 
judge’s “virgin mind,” guaranteeing that the judge would acknowledge 
only the evidence produced in court and decide only on that basis. 
Only certain documents can be transferred63. Additionally, the parties 
can also agree on the transfer of other documents – as well as adding 
certain evidence gathered by the defence. Thus, the conversion from 
“preparatory proceeding evidence” into “trial evidence” happens 
according to the list of documents enumerated in the legal act and to 
the list as agreed by the parties. The presiding, fact-finding judge has 
63 Art. 431(1) points a-h c.p.p. lists these documents: evidence which is objec-
tively impossible to reproduce in court; results of mutual assistance; evidence 
that may be lost before trial; physical evidence connected with the crime, 
and evidence gathered using the incidente probatorio, prior convictions of the 
accused and such documents on which both parties agree.
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no access to other documents64. What is more, the second element 
of this mechanism of elimination of evidence comes into play in the 
beginning of a trial: before trial both parties must point to the evidence 
they plan to rely on and make an evidentiary motion. Before opening of 
the evidentiary proceeding, after the opening statements, the presiding 
judge decides on their admissibility (art. 495 c.p.p.). If the question 
of inadmissibility appears during the evidentiary proceeding, then 
the judge decides on this stage. The judge is both obliged to decide 
on the admissibility of every piece of evidence on the motion of the 
party and ex officio65. This admissibility question is rather to settle 
what information the judge is prepared to hear in the trial, but it does 
not settle whether it may be finally judged “usable” in the evaluation 
of evidence66. Also in the case of this hybrid model the same person 
decides on the facts of the case and on the admissibility of evidence67. 
4.  consEquEncEs of applying a MEchanisM of EliMination of 
EvidEncE
Every adopted mechanism of elimination of evidence has 
elimination of undesired evidence as its goal. However, depending on the 
type of evidence and the type of its defectiveness, elimination may or may 
not take place. There are two possibilities: either an automatic elimination 
on the basis of the legal act or “balancing” of interest in every case on a 
casuistic basis, taking into consideration the scale of violation of law, its 
relevance for the judgment and the fair trial principle68. Interestingly, the 
64 See: MARAFIOTI, Luca. Italian Criminal Procedure … op.cit., p. 93; ILLUMI-
NATI Giulio. The Frustrated Turn to Adversarial Procedure in Italy (Italian 
Criminal Procedure Code of 1988). Washington University Global Studies Law 
Review 2005, p. 6; RYAN, Andrea. Towards a System of European Criminal 
Justice. The problem of admissibility of evidence, London/New York: Rout-
ledge, 2014, p. 227.
65 ILLUMINATI, Giulio. Italy: Statutory Nullities … op.cit., p. 242-243.
66 See the interviews conducted by A. Ryan with the Italian prosecutors: RYAN, 
Andrea. Towards a System … op.cit., p. 218.
67 RYAN, Andrea. Towards a System .. op.cit., p. 218.
68 A good example of this attitude in the Polish law has been given by: D. Solodov, 
I. Solodov, Legal safeguards against involuntary criminal confessions in 
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last element of the mechanism of elimination of undesired evidence has 
the least differences. In both Anglo-Saxon and continental states there 
is no automatic exclusionary rule for improperly obtained evidence. 
The main difference still remains that in one case there are statutory 
foundations for a judge to decide about the illegality or unreliability and 
incredibility of evidence, whereas in the continental states (with the 
exception of Italy) there is no such clear statutory basis.
the contInentAl APProAch
In the continental model there is no coherent theory as to the 
consequences of illegal gathering or presentation of evidence. There is no 
mention of these consequences in the codes of criminal procedure69. In the 
Anglo-Saxon perspective it is often concluded that many European states 
do not have exclusionary rules that would supress evidence improperly 
seized by the police70. This conclusion is not justified. Firstly, from the 
reasons mentioned above – that is, the formal character of all the actions 
taken by procedural authorities in the preparatory proceedings. Secondly, 
although there is no legal provision forbidding the use of illegal evidence, 
in most of the continental states the most common (but not the sole) 
reaction is shifting the final solution to the level of judicial decisions. 
Thirdly, in some cases the legal act itself mentions the consequences of 
violation of specific rules of gathering of evidence as it is in the cases of 
exclusionary rules.
Automatic elimination applies in two cases: firstly, when it comes 
to the rules of exclusion, and secondly, in the case of “invalidity” of 
procedural actions (used in order to eliminate evidence that was acquired 
due to violations of law). As to the remaining deficiencies, the prevailing 
belief is that the lack of a procedural sanction expressed by the legislator 
Poland and Russia, „Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal”, 2020, v. 6(3), p. 
1674. About continental procedural solutions also see: K. Kremens, The au-
thority to order search in a comparative perspective: a call for judicial over-
sight, „Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal”, 2020, v. 6(3), p. 1599-1603.
69 ROGALL, Klaus. Grundsatzfragen der Beweisverbote … op.cit., p. 129.
70 PIZZI, William. Trials Without Truth … op.cit., s. 43.
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does not mean that such a sanction cannot be applied. The admissibility 
of deficiently gathered or presented evidence can be freely assessed by a 
judge, who takes into account the principles arising from the Constitution, 
the ECHR and generally recognized values. This concept assumes that 
not every violation of the law in the process of gathering evidence should 
lead to inadmissibility of evidence, because the type of violation and 
its impact on the entire procedure should be considered: “the possible 
elimination of evidence obtained illegally should take place depending on 
the circumstances of a given case and taking into account many factors, 
such as the weight of the private interest, the weight of the public interest 
or the direction of evidence”71. This conclusion must, however, be seen 
from the perspective of the importance of the principle of substantial 
truth – which plays the central role in a continental trial. Thus, when 
weighting interest, the continental courts must always look for a proper 
balance between the protected interests and the obligation of a continental 
judge to search for the truth72. Also, the practical perspective allows for 
agreement with the statements, that “The disparity between the attention 
71 Such a asumption has been expressed in the Polish literature: WILIŃSKI, 
Paweł. Pojęcie rzetelnego procesu karnego. In: Rzetelny proces karny w 
orzecznictwie sądów polskich i międzynarodowych. WILIŃSKI, Paweł (ed.). 
Warszawa: Scholar, 2011, p. 26; SKORUPKA, Jerzy., Eliminowanie z procesu, 
p. 2747-2748; JASIŃSKI, Wojciech. Nielegalnie … op.cit., p. 89; in the German 
literature: EISENBERG, Ulrich. Beweisrecht der StPO. Spezialkommentar. 10. 
Auflage. C. H. Beck 2017, p. 141, p. 154-158; GLESS, Sabine. Germany … 
op.cit., p. 114; ROGALL, Klaus. Grundsatzfragen der Beweisverbote, p. 145; 
and in the French literature: DARSONVILLE, Audrey. Les limites au principe 
de la liberté de la preuve pour les parties, Dalloz. Actualité, https://www.dal-
loz-actualite.fr/breve/limites-au-principe-de-liberte-de-preuve-pour-par-
ties#.X2SD7IswhPY (access 18.09.2020);) GARÉ, Thierry. L’admission de la 
preuve illégale: la Chambre criminelle persiste et signe, Recueil Dalloz 2000, 
p. 391; MOLINA, Emmanuel. Réflexion critique sur l’évolution paradoxale de 
la liberté de la preuve des infractions en droit français contemporain., Revue 
internationale de droit comparé, n. 54(1), ” 2002, p. 263; MERLE, Roger, VITU 
André. Traité de droit criminel. 2. Procédure pénale. Paris: Cujas, 1989, p. 
162-163; PRADEL, Jean. Procédure pénale, Paris: Cujas, 2014, p. 354-357.
72 GLESS, Sabine. Germany … op.cit., p. 139; WEIGEND, Thomas, The Potential 
to Secure a Fair Trial Through Evidence Exclusion: A German Perspective. 
In: Do Exclusionary Rules Ensure a Fair Trial?: A Comparative Perspective on 
Evidentiary Rules, GLESS, Sabine; RICHTER, Thomas (eds.). Basel: Springer, 
2019, p. 73.
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paid in the literature to the various theories behind exclusionary rules 
and the few actual cases of evidentiary exclusion is striking”73.
In practice, this means that the mechanism of “weighing” legal 
interests and, as a result, eliminating defective or incorrectly obtained 
evidence, has been left to the discretion of the courts. Its application and 
scope most often depend on the stage of the infringement or detection 
of illegality, as well as the nature and consequences of the violation of 
law. Especially in Germany the need to find a pattern and model for 
weighting of various interests in the process of assessing the admissibility 
of evidence has resulted in the creation of plentiful theories which can 
guide the judge: a theory based on the type of the protected interests 
(Rechtkreistheorie), a theory based on the possible violation of the state 
of law principle (Rechtsstaatsprinzip); a theory of weighting of legal 
interests (Abwägungstheorie), and the aim of protection expressed in 
the given provision (Schutzzwecktheorie) or the type of violation of the 
privacy sphere (schlichte Privatsphäre)74. 
Only in Italy is there a statutory provision that specifies the 
prohibition of using illegally obtained evidence (art. 191 c.p.p.). On the 
other hand it is worth mentioning that the previously discussed mechanism 
of nullities used in France and Italy is not subject to weighting – in case 
of fulfilling the statutory premises of nullity of an evidentiary action the 
results of this action cease to exist in a procedural sense.
In the process of assessment of admissibility of evidence, art. 6 
ECHR also plays a distinct role – the Strasbourg Court has developed a 
notion of a fair trial that has become a key element in the analysis of the 
admissibility of evidence in criminal procedures by all the State Parties. 
Article 6 of the Convention refers to the description of the entire model 
of the criminal trial, to the entire legal situation of the accused, and thus 
73 GLESS, Sabine, MACULA, Laura. Exclusionary Rules—Is It Timefor Change? 
In: Do Exclusionary Rules Ensure a Fair Trial?: A Comparative Perspective on 
Evidentiary Rules, GLESS, Sabine; RICHTER, Thomas (eds.). Basel: Springer 
2019, p. 352.
74 ROGALL, Klaus. Grundsatzfragen der Beweisverbote … op.cit., p. 145  ; 
EISENBERG, Ulrich. Beweisrecht, p. 155; SCHRÖDER, Svenja. Beweisverw-
ertungsverbote und die Hypothese rechtmässiger Beweiserlangung im Straf-
prozess, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1992, p. 24 and 66.
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to the type and quality of evidence leading to the conclusion of guilt, 
i.e. the type and method of gathering evidence75. The notion of a fair 
trial - so far characteristic of Anglo-Saxon states - has also penetrated 
into continental European systems of criminal proceedings and began 
to give the law of evidence a new quality. The guarantees resulting from 
this notion become apparent in the case-law of national courts, which 
are now required to assess the standard of evidence in the light of this. 
This multi-level solution allows for differentiating the 
consequences of violations, depending on the gravity of the violation 
and the relevance of the violation of the human rights and constitutional 
principles, such the rule of law76. It is flexible and optimizes the functioning 
of the rules of elimination. However, at the same time, it makes the 
results of “weighting” of admissibility of evidence quite unpredictable. 
the Anglo-sAxon APProAch
In the common law states there is no automatic exclusionary rule 
for improperly obtained evidence: there is not necessarily a connection 
between a violation of law and the elimination of evidence. The courts 
have accepted that improperly obtained evidence can be excluded in the 
exercise of discretion if its use would render the trial unfair77. Interestingly, 
75 See e.g. a more detailed analysis: BACHMAIER, Lorena. Rights and Methods 
to Challenge Evidence and Witnesses in Civil Law Jurisdictions. In: Oxford 
Handbook of Criminal Process. BROWN, Darryl et al. (eds.)., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2019, p. 844-849; HO, Hock Lai. The Fair Trial Rationale 
for Excluding Wrongfully Obtained Evidence. In: Do Exclusionary Rules En-
sure a Fair Trial?: A Comparative Perspective on Evidentiary Rules, GLESS, 
Sabine; RICHTER, Thomas (eds.). Basel: Springer 2019, p. 284; SOLODOV, 
Denis; SOLODOV, Ilia. Legal safeguards against involuntary criminal confes-
sions in Poland and Russia, Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, 2020, v. 
6(3), p. 1670.
76 See: BACHMAIER, Lorena. Rights and Methods … op.cit., p. 853; WILIŃSKI, 
Paweł. Konstytucyjny standard legalności … op.cit., p. 319; ROGALL, Klaus. 
Grundsatzfragen der Beweisverbote … op.cit., p. 129; SKORUPKA, Jerzy. 
Eliminowanie z procesu … op.cit., p. 2787; WEIGEND, Thomas. Germany … 
op.cit., p. 114.
77 CHOO, Andrew, NASH Susan. Improperly Obtained Evidence in the Com-
monwealth: Lessons for England and Wales? The International Journal of 
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despite numerous rules of admissibility of evidence existing in the Anglo-
Saxon states, the same mechanism of judiciary discretion is applied. 
In both England and the United States, it cannot be claimed that the 
consequences of applying rules of admissibility are strictly prescribed: 
only the effect of some rules is automatic, once the conditions for their 
application have been found to exist. Other rules of admissibility lead to a 
conclusion that the trial judge enjoys a wide discretion whether to admit 
evidence78. The view that is presented in the literature points to the fact 
that there is a different degree of judicial discretion in relation to various 
rules of admissibility of evidence. Different rules of admissibility require 
more or less judicial discretion, requiring contextual application to the 
facts of a concrete case79. Although there is a theoretical differentiation 
between legal rules of admissibility and judicial discretion – the first 
ones cannot exist without the second one. 
In the English literature it is considered that both the exclusionary 
and the admissibility rules create grounds for a motion to exclude evidence, 
however, the final decision is left to the decision of a judge. This decision 
requires judge a careful balancing of interests and procedural rights: the 
judge should eliminate a piece of evidence if the harm resulting from 
such evidence would be bigger than a potential advantage80. The Court 
of Appeal has repeatedly refused to accept that the use of improperly 
obtained but reliable evidence has adversely affected the fairness of the 
trial – thus making credibility of evidence, not the method of acquiring 
Evidence & Proof, n. 11, 2007, p. 78.
78 HANNIBAL, Martin; MOUNTFORD, Lisa. Criminal Litigation 2019-2020 (Le-
gal Practice Course Manuals), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 100.
79 ROBERTS, Paul; ZUCKERMAN, Adrian. Criminal Evidence … op.cit., p. 99.
80 CHOO, Andrew, NASH Susan. Improperly Obtained … op.cit., p. 79; ASH-
WORTH, Andrew J. Excluding Evidence as Protecting Rights. Criminal Law 
Review, n. 3, 1977, p. 723; CHOO, Andrew; NASH Susan. What’s the Matter 
with S. 78?, Criminal Law Review, n. 12, 1999, p. 929; DENNIS, Ian, H. Recon-
structing the Law of Criminal Evidence. Current Legal Problems n. 42, 1989, 
p. 21; GREVLING, Katharine. Fairness and the Exclusion of Evidence under 
s. 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. Law Quarterly Review, n. 
113, 1997, p. 667; ORMEROD, David, BIRCH Diane. The evolution of the 
discretionary exclusion of evidence. Criminal Law Review, n. 9, 2004, p. 767 
HO, Hock Lai. The Fair Trial Rationale … op.cit., p. 294.
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it, the main test for admissibility of evidence81. This regime – allowing for 
the necessary flexibility – makes the judge responsible for “the success 
of this admissibility regime”82. It is the trial judge who is responsible 
for supplying the most credible and probative information to the jury. 
Finding the proper balance must take into consideration not only the 
prerequisites described in the legal act and evidentiary principles of 
general application but also the European fair trial standards83. Also in 
this case an equal basis for exclusion of evidence constitutes the Human 
Rights Act 1998, incorporating inter alia art. 6 ECHR. The English law 
can be characterized by the general absence of fixed rules of automatic 
inadmissibility and other “bright-line” rules and “rather, a case-by-case 
approach is favoured”84. 
In the United States the exclusionary rules are understood as 
results of violations of the Amendments to the Constitution. At the same 
time the Constitution is silent as to the results of these violations. The 
consequences are established in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, which 
formerly decided upon an automatic elimination of evidence acquired 
in a violation of constitutional rights and freedoms. The landmark case 
was Mapp v. Ohio85, where the Court decided that the exclusionary rule 
applies in state courts – in this regard, that it obliges the exclusion of 
evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution (typically the Fourth, 
Fifth or Sixth Amendments). The automatic effect of this rule is however 
restricted by the exceptions to this rule: the “good faith exception” and 
the “impeachment exception”, as well the exceptions to the “fruits of the 
poisonous tree doctrine”. In consequence, the U.S. exclusionary rules 
81 CHOO, Andrew, NASH Susan. Improperly Obtained … op.cit., p. 79.
82 ROBERTS, Paul, ZUCKERMAN, Adrian. Criminal Evidence … op.cit., p. 346.
83 ROBERTS, Paul, ZUCKERMAN, Adrian. Criminal Evidence … op.cit., p. 399.
84 ROBERTS, Paul, ZUCKERMAN, Adrian. Criminal Evidence … op.cit., p. 25; 
JACKSON, John, D., SUMMERS, Sarah, J. The Internationalisation of Crim-
inal Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 38; CHOO, 
Andrew. England and Wales: Fair Trial Analysis and the Presumed Admissi-
bility of Physical Evidence. In: THAMAN, Stephen (ed.). Exclusionary Rules 
in Comparative Law, Dordrecht - Heidelberg - New York – London: Springer, 
2013, p. 352.
85 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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were historically considered to be more categorical than the English and 
continental rules and usually were not subject to balancing86. 
Currently, however, the Supreme Court’s approach to the 
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is characterized by a parsimonious 
conception of the rights guaranteed by the constitution based on (or 
justified by) a textualist theory of constitutional interpretation. E.g. the 
Court has unequivocally rejected the proposition that exclusion of illegally 
seized evidence is required by the Fourth Amendment, and regards 
the exclusionary rule as a judicially created deterrent remedy designed 
to protect the right against unreasonable search and seizures87. In the 
process of refusing to consider evidence as inadmissible, described as 
“deconstitutionalization of the exclusionary rule”88, the perception of the 
nature of exclusionary rules has changed. They have moved from being 
an institution belonging to the area of “individual’s rights” into the area 
of “sanction for violation of the law”, a “remedy”, whose main aim is to 
discipline the procedural authorities – although there is no final agreement 
on this in either jurisprudence or doctrine89. The Supreme Court recently 
stated that the exclusionary rule is applicable only “where its deterrence 
benefits outweighs its substantial social costs” (so called “cost-benefit 
balancing”)90. In consequence, if the deterrence potential of the rule is 
86 The perspective adopted in some of the U.S. literature, e.g. WORRALL, John 
L. Criminal Procedure. From First Contact to Appeal. New York: Pearson Ed-
ucation 2007, p. 56. 
87 CAMMACK, Mark E. The United States: The Rise and Fall of the Constitu-
tional Exclusionary Rule. In: Exclusionary Rules in Comparative Law. THA-
MAN, Stephen. (ed.)., Dordrecht - Heidelberg - New York – London: Spring-
er, 2013, p. 4 and 10; LAFAVE, Wayne, ISRAEL, Jerold, KING, Nancy, KERR, 
Orin. Criminal Procedure … op.cit., p. 133-136.
88 CAMMACK, Mark E. The United States … op.cit., p. 31. See also the juris-
prudence: Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009), 129 S.CT. 695, 172 
L.Ed.2d 496 (2009); Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S.Ct. 1841, 1846 (2009).
89 See e.g. Dickerson v. United States 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
90 So called „cost-beneft” balancing, used e.g. in Hudson v. Michigen, 547 U.S. 
586, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006). See e.g.: CAMMACK, Mark E. 
The United States … op.cit., p. 5; LAFAVE, Wayne, ISRAEL, Jerold, KING, 
Nancy, KERR, Orin. Criminal Procedure … op.cit., p. 139; PATTENDEN, 
Rosemary. Pre-verdict Judicial Fact-finding in Criminal Trials with Juries, 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, n. 29(1), 2009, p. 17; HO, Hock Lai. Exclusion 
of Wrongfully, p. 835.
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too negligible or if it is outweighed by the costs of the exclusionary rule, 
then exclusion should not happen91. The Court’s attitude is summed up 
by saying that exclusion “has always been our last resort, not our first 
impulse”92. However, the balancing does not depend on the circumstances 
of the adjudicated case, but rather on a category of evidence that serves 
a certain purpose93. 
If exclusionary rules are provided for in state law, the rules are 
different: in some cases the provision actually says that the sanction is 
exclusion of evidence. In other cases courts may utilize the exclusionary 
rule when the provision in question confers a substantial right, especially if 
it is one that can be said to relate rather closely to constitutional protection94. 
In consequence, also in this model of elimination of evidence, there are no 
automatic consequences of violation of the law in the process of gathering 
evidence and the final decision is handed to the judge. However, in this 
case the balancing happens in decidedly more restricted frames.
5. conclusions 
The analysis conducted in this text led to several conclusions. 
Firstly, there are two stages where the admissibility rules operate in two 
different models of criminal trial. In the continental model, the main body 
of rules of evidence must be applied during preparatory proceedings, 
whereas in the common law states the rules of evidence are designed to 
be used at trial. As a result, the continental states do not have statutory 
91 See: Herring v. United States 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
92 In Herring v. United States 555 U.S. 135 (2009) a case cited by: CAMMACK, 
Mark E. The United States … op.cit., s. 32.
93 See: TURNER, Jenia I. Regulating Interrogations and Excluding Confessions 
in the United States: Balancing Individual Rightsand the Search for the Truth. 
In: Do Exclusionary Rules Ensure a Fair Trial?: A Comparative Perspective on 
Evidentiary Rules, GLESS, Sabine; RICHTER Thomas (eds.). Basel: Springer, 
2019, p. 104.
94 E.g. U.S. v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 99 S. Ct. 1465, 49 L.Ed.2d 733 (1979) and 
Virginia v. Moore 553 U.S. 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) cited by: 
LAFAVE, Wayne, ISRAEL, Jerold, KING, Nancy, KERR, Orin. Criminal Proce-
dure … op.cit.,p. 136.
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provisions that would forbid the use of illegally obtained evidence, whereas 
the Anglo-Saxon model provides for multiple rules of admissibility and 
presentation of evidence at trial. Secondly, the lack of detailed statutory 
rules of admissibility and presentation of evidence at trial is bound to the 
deciding role of the continental judge during evidentiary proceedings. 
In the common law model the parties decide about the scope and way of 
presentation of evidence, within the rules provided by the law. The judge 
plays a central role as to both deciding about admissibility and the rules of 
presentation of evidence. Thirdly, in continental trials, evidence collected 
in the case file plays a predominant role in the mechanism of elimination 
of evidence – once evidence is included in the file it must stay there, 
even if disqualified in the process of fact-finding - declared by the judge 
“inadmissible”. It also creates the situation that the adjudicating judge is 
familiar with the evidence that can be later declared “inadmissible”. At the 
same time in the common law model, the judge has no prior knowledge of 
the evidence that will be presented at trial. The fifth difference between 
the analysed models relates to the presence of an effective and equal 
to the parties procedure of deciding about admissibility of evidence in 
the Anglo-Saxon model of evidentiary law. This procedure allows the 
parties to control the admissibility of evidence and permanently eliminate 
inadmissible items from the trial. However, there is no similar procedure 
in the continental model. 
Although the exclusion of undesired information is administered 
differently in the two analysed models of criminal trial, the result of these 
mechanisms may be similar. In every analysed model of elimination of 
evidence, notwithstanding its affiliation to the model of trial whether it 
would be continental or Anglo-Saxon, the final arbiter of admissibility of 
evidence is a judge. S/he takes the final decision as to the evidence95. In 
consequence, both legal models can be perceived as chaotic and casuistic, 
as there is no certainty for the parties as to the final decision of a judge – 
“as predictability in the application of an exclusionary rule increases with 
its determinacy”96. This model is often perceived as dependant on the 
95 GALLIGAN, Denis, James. Discretionary Powers, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1986, p. 6, 8 and 22.
96 HO, Hock Lai. Exclusion of Wrongfully … op.cit., p. 835.
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personal skills and convictions of the actors of the trial: both the judge 
and the representatives of the parties. On the other hand, this model is 
also flexible and allows for weighting legally protected interests in every 
case. It does not signify that the judge has total liberty as to the result of 
such a decision. A judge must take into consideration not only “external” 
premises – such as the purpose of truth-finding and of fairness and justice, 
an assessment of the purpose of a given action and its circumstances, the 
rightness of its performance, in view of the existence of general clauses 
in a given case97 - but also intrinsic arguments, rooted in the judge’s 
conscience. Such a task requires from a judge to have certain skills in 
legal science and a stable sense of justice. Moreover, the judge’s decision 
may be subject to review by the court of appeal. 
The analysis presented above also leads to the conclusion that the 
Anglo-Saxon model of elimination of undesired evidence is very complex, 
but coherent and carefully designed. It allows for equal participation by 
both parties and for effective procedures of challenging the admissibility 
of evidence. On the other hand, the mechanism for blocking information 
from becoming evidence in the continental model does not function in a 
predictable, way as there are several deficiencies identified in this model. 
In the continental states it cannot be said that there is a comprehensive 
“mechanism” for blocking information from becoming evidence in a 
criminal trial – it is rather a partial mechanism, quite unpredictable. It 
can be thus seen that in the continental model there are evident defects 
in the mechanism of elimination of undesired evidence. 
Firstly, there is no statutory basis for excluding illegal or illegally 
acquired evidence (except for the hybrid model of Italy) – and without 
such a clear basis for excluding evidence, motions of the parties (usually 
defence) to exclude illegal evidence become often disregarded by the court. 
Potentially the court may base decisions on only art. 6 ECHR or the national 
Constitutions98. Secondly, there is no separate procedure that allows for 
conducting an adversarial, a priori elimination of undesired evidence. The 
assumption that there is a need to eliminate undesirable evidence should 
presuppose the existence of an effective procedure allowing a party to 
97 PATTENDEN, Rosemary. Pre-verdict … op.cit., p. 4.
98 GLESS, Sabine; MACULA Laura. Exclusionary Rules … op.cit., p. 361.
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apply for the elimination of such evidence. Even if in bench trials it is 
the professional judge who decides about the admissibility of evidence, 
holding the role of fact-finder at the same time, the procedure for deciding 
on the admissibility of evidence in the Anglo-Saxon model is equal and 
the same for both parties. Meanwhile, in the continental model, the judge 
examines the evidence in the case file; as a result, as a rule, s/he becomes 
familiar with all prosecution evidence collected during the preparatory 
proceedings. This conclusion leads to the third serious flaw of this model, 
that is the previous knowledge of a judge about the evidence gathered in 
the preparatory proceedings, which is not yet evidence from the point of 
view of the trial stage. So even if a piece of information does not ultimately 
become evidence in court proceedings, “the damage has already been done”: 
the judge already has knowledge of evidence that can be potentially illegal, 
unreliable and irrelevant to the case99. Fourthly, the unitary structure of 
the continental court (also in the jury trials in France and Italy where 
both the professional judges and the jury member adjudicate together) 
also makes it more difficult to “hide” the illegal evidence from the eyes 
of the fact-finder100. Yet, it should be clear, that the aim of the elimination 
mechanism is not including undesired evidence in the evidentiary basis 
for fact-finding. Moreover, there is no procedure in which the defense 
could request that the evidence contained in the case-file be declared 
inadmissible. The defense can make a free (not regulated in the code of 
criminal procedure) motion during trial – however, there is no obligation 
on the part of the court to react to this motion.
These “deficiencies” of the continental model lead to a conclusion 
that this model of elimination of evidence is incoherent: the obligation to 
eliminate evidence from the fact-finding process should be bound with 
the court’s legal prohibition to become acquainted with such evidence. 
The blockade should lead to the fact that such evidence „disappears” 
in the procedural sense - it is also eliminated from the case files. The 
“evidence” cannot be considered to be everything that is in the case 
99 Even thought the law forces the judge to „forget about” such evidence: - see: 
WEIGEND, Thomas. The Potential to Secure … op.cit., p. 75.
100 It was also observed by: BACHMAIER, Lorena. Rights and Methods … op.cit., 
p. 854.
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file. Such documents cannot constitute the basis for making evidentiary 
findings, if there is no signal or decision proving that the court was 
acquainted with such documents before or during the trial, in order to 
rule on their admissibility.
These two problems could be solved by introducing a construction 
characteristic for the mixed procedure model of increased adversariality 
as functions in Italy. A pre-trial hearing presided over by a pre-trial 
judge would allow for the selection of evidence gathered in preparatory 
proceedings (by both parties) so that undesired evidence would not reach 
the eyes of the fact-finder. Such a selection process should therefore 
take place mostly before trial, and be led by a judge who will not preside 
over the case during trial. This additional stage of procedure – taking 
place during a type of pre-trial hearing, would allow the parties to meet 
and debate over admissibility of evidence – and thus to control their 
admissibility. Also, importantly for the continental models, such a hearing 
would become an “indirect form of judicial control over the actions 
taken in the preparatory proceedings”101 – especially in the states where 
there is no investigative judge. Moreover, the result of determining a 
piece of evidence as inadmissible should be the practical elimination of 
such documents from the case file. On both stages of trial the rules of 
admissibility should be effectively used in a way that is equal for both 
parties. There is also a need for introducing an obligatory reaction on 
the part of the court to a motion of the parties as to inadmissibility of 
evidence. Granting the parties such a right would be an expression of 
respecting the procedural principles included in the code in a criminal 
procedure, such as the right to defence and to a fair trial, the principle of 
legality of the actions of procedural organs, the principle of procedural 
loyalty, all of which also result from broader constitutional, conventional 
and international law values102. 
It should be stressed that a criminal trial can be considered to 
be adversarial only if the rules of admissibility of evidence operate on 
101 This need is stressed in the Polish literature, see: ZAGRODNIK, Jarosław. 
Model interakcji postępowania przygotowawczego oraz postępowania głów-
nego w procesie karnym. Warszawa: Wolter Kluwer 2013, p. 193.
102 SKORUPKA, Jerzy. Eliminowanie z procesu … op.cit., p. 2805.
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equal terms for both parties, and when the issues of admissibility are 
adjudicated in a clear and equal procedure. There is a connection between 
the operating mechanism of elimination of undesired evidence and the 
degree of implementation of fair trial principles. In the continental states 
the obligation of the judge to search for the true account of event leads 
to a “free proof” principle and total discretion for the judge to decide 
on the admissibility of evidence. In the Anglo-Saxon states the central 
position of the adversariality principle leads to the dominant position 
of the parties in the mechanism of elimination of evidence. The parties 
both decide on what evidence will be presented in trial and whether 
to object to the admissibility of the evidence introduced by the other 
party. If the continental models move to be “adversarial” – even if not 
in a clear, full meaning of this notion as used by the Anglo-Saxon states, 
but in the meaning of being “contradictoire”103, that is in compliance with 
the requirements of art. 6 ECHR – they could improve the procedure 
of ruling on admissibility of evidence. Certainly the current situation, 
where the judge is acquainted before trial with the evidence presented 
by the prosecution and there is a “free flow” of “preparatory proceedings 
evidence” into the group of “trial evidence” is unacceptable and cannot 
be justified on the basis of a claim that the prosecutor is a “guardian 
of law” in the continental states, as this claim does not withstand the 
test of practice. 
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